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SOVIET POLICY 
ON THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR 
SEVINC CARLSON* 
Soviet policy regarding the sea-bed should be viewed in the light of its 
growing oceanographic fleet, fishing fleet, merchant marine, and navy. 
During the last decade, the USSR has changed from basically a land 
power to both a land and a respectable sea power. 
Parity with the United States has been achieved in the field of 
oceanography. The Russian oceanographic fleet is presently the largest 
in size and tonnage in the world, consisting of ships designed to operate 
in a variety of climates, performing complex and specialized research. 1 
The fishing fleet of the USSR is also the largest and the most modern 
in the world. It is technologically superior to that of the United States, 
having been developed under a policy of commitment to expansion in 
exploitation of the ocean's fisheries. After the 7-Year Plan of 1959-1965, 
a new Soviet 5-Year Plan for the development of the fishing industry 
was adopted in 1966. According to this plan, a 50% increase over the 
1965 fishery ladings, or a total of 8,500,000 tons by 1970 was expected. It 
was anticipated that close to 90% of this catch would come from areas of 
the high seas, far from Soviet coastal waters. 2 
The Soviet merchant fleet, too, is continually growing,3 presently 
ranking sixth among the world's merchant marine fleets. Dedication to 
growth and expansion is readily evidenced by the fact that 80% of the 
Soviet fleet is less than ten years old. 
As for the Soviet navy, it is the second largest, and, perhaps, the most 
modern navy in the world, making its presence felt in all parts of the 
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INST. PROC., Apr. 15, 1970, at 35-43. 
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globe.4 The growth and development of a modern navy has been a 
somewhat recent phenomenon for the USSR, occurring most 
significantly in the last decade. Soviet policy towards law of the sea 
matters, then, is naturally influenced by these factors. The push 
towards an ever-expanding role in the world's oceans, engendered 
primarily in the national interest, clearly colors the Soviet views, as 
expressed in current international discussions. 
THE RESERVATION OF THE SEA-BED AND 
THE OcEAN FLOOR FoR PEACEFUL 
PURPOSES 
After the Malta proposal of August 17, 1967, and during the 
examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful 
purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, the approach of the USSR has been one of caution and 
emphasis on the need for further study before the formulation of a 
principle to regulate the use of the ocean floor and its resources. The 
primary need, according to the USSR, is for careful preparatory study, 
the collection of data, and the coordination of existing studies and 
activities. Its representatives have emphasized that the study should be 
carried out by the States, themselves, with the assistance of the 
Secretary General and the Secretariat of the United Nations.5 The 
Soviet delegation did not favor the creation of an ad hoc committee, 
fearing that it would lay the foundation for the establishment of a 
future permanent organ. It did not oppose the resolution calling for the 
creation of such a committee, however, expecting that the committee's 
purpose and activities would be severely limited b:v the terms of the 
draft resolution itself. 6 
In a later session, the USSR displayed its cautionary approach b:v 
abstaining from the voting on the resolution of December 21, 1968, 
which created a permanent 42-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor. Furthermore, the Soviet delegation 
voted against the draft resolution of the same date requesting a stud:v 
by the Secretary General on the establishment of international 
machinery to explore and exploit the resources of the sea-bed and ocean 
floor and the convening in 1972 of a Conference on the Law of the Sea. 7 
4. SOVIET SEA POWER, supra note 1, at 31-50; Rise of Soviet Sea Power, ORDNANCE, Jan .-
Feb. 1970, at 394-98; SOVIET NAVAL EXPANSION, WORLD SURVEY, Main Series, London, Feb. 
1971, at 1-20. 
5. U.N. Doc. AI C. 1/PV. 1544, at 31. 32-35 (1967). 
6. U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1544, at 32-35, 38-40 0967). 
7. G.A. Res. 2749 <XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28 at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
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According to the USSR delegation: (1) appropriate conditions for the 
establishment of international machinery did not exist; (2) essential 
scientific data were lacking; (3) it was not clear how profitable the 
industrial development of sea-bed resources would prove in the near 
future; and ( 4) a more advanced technological means of exploration and 
exploitation at great depths without harm to the marine environment 
would have to be developed. 
The Soviet delegation expressed dissent at the idea of granting 
jurisdiction over the sea-bed to an international machinery. Thus, Soviet 
policy has reflected opposition to authorization for the international 
machinery to carry out exploration and exploitation of sea-bed 
resources, since, in the final analysis, it might "beco.me a capitalistic 
undertaking and the tool of monopolies ." Rather, its role, as envisioned 
by the Soviet policy-makers, should be limited to assisting countries in 
carrying out such exploration and exploitation in the interests of all 
mankind. The Soviet delegation felt, moreover, that it would be futile to 
attempt to establish the structure of such machinery before the 
conclusion of a universal, international agreement on a sea-bed regime. 8 
During the August, 1970, meeting of the Sea-bed Committee in Geneva, 
Mr. Smirnow asked the United States delegate whether he could accept 
the formula for "an international treaty of a universal character." The 
U.S. delegate, Mr. Thacher, said he would prefer a formula on the 
order of being "as universal as possible," a premise which Mr . 
Smirnow found unacceptable. 9 
The Soviet delegates have stressed that a number of specific norms of 
International Law can already be applied to the sea-bed, making 
uncritical the construction of new formulations. Among those identified 
were: (1) the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of 
the high seas; (2) the right to engage in "fisheries" conducted by means 
of equipment embedded in the floor of the sea under circumstances 
specified in Article 13 of the Convention of Fishing and Conservation of 
the Living Resources of the High Seas; (3) the freedom of scientific 
research; ( 4) respect for the legal rights and interests of other states; (5) 
respect for the generall y recognized freedoms of the high seas, including 
the freedom of navigation and fishing; and, possibly, (6) de-
nuclearization of the sea-bed. 10 
The international responsibility for insuring the conservation of the 
mineral resources, prevention of pollution, prevention of the creation of 
8. U.N. Doc. A/ AC. 138/SR. 29-44 at 16-17, 129-84, 187-96 ( 1970). 
9. Id. at 189 0970). 
10. Butler, Some Recent Developments in Soviet Maritime Law, 4 INT'L L AWYER 695, 
706-707 (1970). 
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unjustified obstacles, and the insuring of the safety of the personnel 
should, according to the Soviet delegation, be borne by the states. As to 
the establishment of an international machinery, the Soviet delegation 
enumerated conditions which it insists such machinery should meet, 
such as: (1) It must be open to participation by all states without any 
discrimination and in accordance with the principle of sovereign 
equality, regardless of whether or not the state is a member of the 
United Nations or its specialized agencies; (2) It must exclude an~· 
possibility of activities being carried out in the interests of single states 
to the detriment of other states; (3) It must insure that the obligations 
undertaken by participating states are carried out fully and must 
promote the rational development of sea-bed resources, in particular 
through the introduction and application of new technology; (4) Finally, 
it must prevent the plundering and pollution of the marine 
environment. 11 
In relation to the question of the need to insure within the framework 
of the international regime to be established, an equitable sharing of 
the proceeds and benefits resulting from the exploitation of marine 
resources, the USSR delegate, Mr. Kulazhenkov, reiterated his 
delegation's view that the question of benefits should be studied within 
the framework of preparation of an agreement on the international 
regime. It was regarded as essential to have some definite basis for the 
sharing of benefits and not to formulate hasty conclusions. As there 
were different conceptions of what would be equitable, Mr. 
Kulazhenkov said that the term "equitable sharing" would have to be 
carefully studied. The USSR believed that the benefits should be 
available to all mankind and not merely to particular segments of the 
world population. 12 
As to the question of granting licenses, the Soviet delegation pointed 
out that the proposed system for granting licenses was incomplete and 
might even be harmful to the interests of many states. Four t~· pes of 
licensing had been proposed: (1) licensing on a first-come, first-served 
basis; (2) licensing by lottery; (3) licensing on the basis of the 
applicant's qualifications; (4) licensing on the basis of the highest 
bidder. In addition, some delegations had proposed that licenses should 
be granted not only to states, but also to private companies. According 
to the Soviet delegation, all those terms of licensing would, in practice, 
give an advantage to particular groups of countries and monopolies and 
would serve the narrow interests of individual states and companies 
rather than those of mankind as a whole. 
11. U.N. Doc . A/ AC. 138/SR. 29-44 at 95 (1970). 
12. Id. at 184-85, 197 (1970). 
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In the Soviet view, licensing was only one of the many complex 
questions relating to the international machinery which remained to be 
solved and which required further, careful, and detailed study.13 In a 
statement made by the USSR representative in the Economic and 
Technical Sub-committee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction, the need to base the economic and technical 
conditions and rules for the exploitation of the resources of the deep 
sea-bed on fuller information was stressed. Further, it was emphasized 
that these conditions and rules should form part of an international 
agreement on a regime for the exploitation of the mineral resources of 
the sea-bed. The Soviet delegation considered it necessary in 
determining the nature of operations to distinguish between the 
following: (1) surveys for scientific purposes; (2) surveys for industrial 
purposes; and (3) industrial exploitation of deposits of mineral raw 
materials by any technological means. 14 
Another point consistently stressed by the USSR delegation and 
included in the Soviet draft of March 18, 1969, on Prohibition of the Use 
for Military Purposes of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and the 
Subsoil Thereof, has been the necessity for halting all military activity 
in the sea-bed. The Soviet delegation emphasized the great significance 
which the USSR attaches to the use of the sea-bed exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. The Soviet draft Treaty on Prohibition of the Use for 
Military Purposes of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil 
Thereof prohibited the placement on the sea-bed, the ocean floor, and 
the subsoil thereof of objects with nuclear weapons or any other 
weapons of mass destruction, as well as the setting up of military bases, 
structures, installations, fortifications, and other objects of a military 
nature. 15 
The USSR was one of the sixty-two nations that signed the Treaty on 
the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in 
the Subsoil Thereof in Washington, on February 11, 1971. 16 
During the course of 1971, the USSR submitted to the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits 
of National Jurisdiction, provisional draft articles of a treaty on the use 
of the seabed for peaceful purposes that included the points previously 
made. The USSR delegation, in the explanatory note submitted by 
13. Id. at 95. 
14. U.N. Doc. Al AC. 138/SC.2/SR 35-40 at 29-30 (1970). 
15. Hearings on S.Res. 33 Before the Subcomm. on Ocean Space of the Comm. 
on Foreign Re/,ations, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. 16-17 (1969). 
16. 64 DEP'T STATE BULL., 288-90 (1971). 
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them, pointed out that the present draft did not contain "provisons 
regarding issues relating to licenses for industrial exploration and 
exploitation of seabed resources and distribution of benefits" but 
"merely noted the existence of these issues" (articles 9 and 14). 
According-to the Soviet delegation, these issues are "closely linked with 
the problems of establishment of the 12-mile limit of the territorial sea, 
the securing of freedom of passage through straits used for 
international navigation, and fishing in waters adjacent to the 
territorial sea." The USSR delegation would be prepared to submit 
specific texts of the articles still outstanding in its draft, "should a 
solution of the latter problems be in sight" so that "an agreement on 
these matters can be reached as a package deal." 17 
Soviet bloc geologists who met in a four-day conference in the Baltic 
Sea Port of Riga in April, 1971 decided to have an ambitious program to 
survey for and extract valuable minerals found on the ocean floor. They 
agreed to form an International Coordinating Center of Marine 
Exploration in the Soviet Union to insure "rational use of mineral 
resources of the oceans." The Center would be open to the members of 
COMECON (The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) and joint 
expeditions would be undertaken to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans to 
select prospective sites for mineral exploitation. 18 
CONCLUSIONS 
The policy of the USSR towards an international regime governing 
the uses of the deep sea-bed is still undergoing an evolution. Like most 
other countries, the USSR is taking a rather cautious approach to this 
new and important concern. The Soviet view, as reflected in the 
statements of the Soviet delegations to the United Nations, is to 
initially resolve by international agreement all questions concerning 
the width of territorial waters and the precise outer limits of the 
continental shelf. In this respect, the Soviet and United States policies 
seem to coincide. As contrasted to the United States, however, the 
USSR appears to be opposed to the establishment of international 
machinery to explore and exploit the sea-bed resources. It prefers that 
this exploration and exploitation be carried out by the States, 
themselves. 
Since the Soviet Union has established its power in the world's 
oceans, it has seemingly been loathe to sacrifice its hard-earned 
superiority. It is to be hoped that as the discussions continue, the USSR 
and the United States will find further areas of agreement, enabling the 
use of deep sea resources for the "common heritage of mankind." 
17. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/8421 (1971). 
18. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1971, at 10, col. C. 
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